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Abstract and Keywords
The fact that we know the end points of formal colonial rule may lead us to forget that, 
for those involved, the process appeared less determined and more contingent. It is 
deceptively easy to trip over the supposed ‘milestone’ of the Second World War, ascribing 
undue influence to a failing capacity or will to rule among the colonial powers 
themselves. Such generalizations leave no room for agency among colonized peoples 
themselves and dismiss both rulers and ruled as essentially homogenous, almost 
preprogrammed to behave stereotypically as reactionaries or revolutionaries. 
Recognizing these interpretive problems, political analysts of European decolonization 
are now more divided over the extent to which the Second World War prefigured the end 
of European colonial rule. Much of the evidence for a strong causal link is powerful. By 
1950 the geopolitical maps of eastern, southern, and western Asia were markedly less 
colonial. The justificatory language for empire was also different, evidence of the turn 
towards a technocratic administrative style that would soon become the norm in much of 
the global South. If basic political rights were frequently denied within dependent 
territories, a stronger accent on improved living standards gave imperial powers 
something with which to muffle the rising chorus of transnational criticism against 
colonial abuses. For all that, the concept of the Second World War as a watershed in the 
end of empires should not be accepted uncritically. This chapter explores the reasons 
why.
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THE Second World War is still regarded by some scholars as a watershed so obvious in its 
effects on European colonialism that little or no examination of the precise connections 
between global conflict and colonial collapse is required. Texts on decolonization 
frequently take 1945 as their starting point, making the implicit assumption that empire 
was increasingly untenable for Europe’s imperial powers. It is easy to see why; after all, 
the supportive evidence abounds. Britain and France, Europe’s pre-eminent imperial 
nations, were each bankrupted by the war. By 1945 they faced massive tasks of domestic 
reconstruction that necessarily drew primordial attention and demanded vast resources. 
For the Dutch and Belgians, as well as the French, defeat and occupation promoted forms 
of wartime collaboration that mocked any ethically presumptive ‘right to rule’ other 
societies. Ruthlessly extractive ‘imperial war efforts’ in Africa and Asia, and heightened 
wartime restrictions on people’s freedom to move, to consume, and to meet, alienated 
local populations who were compelled to work harder for a conflict they never owned. 
And, for all of western Europe’s imperial nations, an enduring reluctance to confront the 
obvious political implications of a supposedly ‘just war’ in defence of freedom made it 
harder still for empire administrators to claim that they had colonial communities’ best 
interests at heart. A struggle between competing ideological systems, one of which made 
racial politics its core rationale, the war ultimately rendered colonial injustice more 
visible. Speaking in Arlington, Virginia, on Memorial Day, 1942, hadn’t Sumner Welles, 
Roosevelt’s idealistic under-secretary of state, justified American involvement in the 
Second World War by calling publicly for a global, anti-colonial crusade?
If this war is in fact a war for the liberation of peoples, it must assure the 
sovereign equality of peoples throughout the world … Discrimination between 
peoples because of their race, creed or color must be abolished. The age of 
imperialism is ended.
Anti-colonial rhetoric might force Europe’s imperial rulers to rethink their 
arguments for empire, but, in the short term, changing military fortunes proved more 
critical. Devastatingly rapid imperial collapses in the face of Japan’s onward march 
through mainland Asia destroyed any residual belief in European imperial invincibility. 
But Japan’s victories in Asia in early 1942 were not the first disasters for Europe’s 
imperial powers. Others were made by the warring Europeans themselves. Three weeks 
after Marshal Philippe Pétain announced the French surrender, on 10 July 1940 British 
service chiefs cast around for an alternative to the imminent consolidation of a French 
regime that seemed likely to bend to German and Italian wishes. The one option 
discussed related to General Charles de Gaulle. The self-proclaimed leader of Free 
France, de Gaulle and his supporters had formed a nascent resistance movement, 
headquartered in London and eager to fight on. To assist him, the British generals 
discussed whether a small ‘Gaullist’ expeditionary force might sail to Algiers. The Royal 
Navy would escort it; American-supplied weapons would equip it. Algeria was 
deliberately chosen. France’s one substantial settler territory, it was constitutionally 
integrated with mainland France. From a location that was administratively—and 
symbolically—both the heart of the French Empire and ‘home soil’, de Gaulle could 
declare the Free French intention to reconquer metropolitan France, probably via 
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invasion and defeat of Fascist Italy.  It was heady stuff. And it was hopelessly unrealistic. 
De Gaulle’s movement was—and would remain—acutely resentful of its de facto 
dependency on stronger allies. More importantly, every tenet of the service chiefs’ 
discussion was misplaced. Algeria’s settlers, if not yet solidly united behind Pétain’s Vichy 
regime, were politically and temperamentally inclined to reject Free France and its 
presumptuous leader. After all, the General’s British partners had killed almost 2,000 
French sailors during a bombardment of the port of Oran only a week earlier.  Nor could 
Algeria really be considered a part of France. It was a colony in which ethnic 
discrimination, typified by the political marginalization, economic neglect, and cultural 
denigration of the Muslim majority, would erupt into political violence at war’s end.
Not surprisingly, the proposed Algiers landing never occurred. Instead, in late September 
1940 de Gaulle was ferried to Dakar, administrative capital of the French West African 
federation, in a remarkably similar—and equally misguided—operation. Perhaps 
understandably, the failure of the Dakar expedition mattered most to Britain’s imperial 
administrators because of its wider implications for British Africa, and for the established 
colonial order more generally. Colonial Secretary Lord Lloyd put things bluntly:
Our strategical ideas for Africa were formed on the basis of the French Alliance. 
Since the French collapsed we have had to do a complete mental somersault. The 
African situation is now novel and unexpected … The magnitude of our African 
interests is out of all proportion to our defences. These interests are in fact 
continental. The African territories under the rule of the Colonial Office cover an 
area of 2,000,000 square miles. There are living in them over 43,000,000 people, 
for whose destinies we are responsible. The addition of the Union of South Africa 
and the Sudan … brings these totals up to 4,652,000 square miles and 
60,000,000 people … Our defensive positions there are lamentably weak, and we 
have given little thought to the strategic problems which may now immediately 
arise. It is imperative that we should think out now, before it is too late, the 
complicated issues involved.
British and French imperial prospects—together or alone—were bleaker still in South 
East Asia. In British Malaya a series of industrial strikes in tin-mining compounds and 
Singapore’s massive naval dockyard had been orchestrated by the colony’s Communist 
Party with varying degrees of success since 1937.  The date was no coincidence. It 
signified the Party’s closer identification with its larger Chinese cousin and with China’s 
desperate struggle against Japanese invasion. Each of these causes was inflected with a 
strongly anti-imperialist rhetoric, the strength and appeal of which intensified as the 
transnational ties between Chinese communities throughout South East Asia spread in 
response to the growing Japanese threat.  Elsewhere, Vietnamese, Burmese, and 
Indonesian leftists, as well as other civil society groups determined to avoid a future 
restoration of European colonial rule, sought wider support at home and overseas. Put 
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sociopolitical conditions in which local, but transnationally connected, networks of future 
anti-colonial insurgency took root.
Malaya’s exposure to Japanese attack was, of course, heightened by the increasingly 
tenuous French grip over the Indochinese peninsula. French Indochina’s Second World 
War is usually discussed in relation to a wartime colonial turn towards Vichy, the rise of 
Vietnamese Communist resistance, wartime famine, and ultimate revolution in 1945. But 
it also had significant ramifications for the security of French—and British—imperialism 
far removed from the South China Sea. During 1941 and 1942 southern Vietnam provided 
the bulk of what little organic rubber the Third Reich could obtain for its war industries. 
And evidence of Vichy’s trans-shipment of Vietnamese rubber helped the British 
authorities to persuade their US counterparts to break with Pétain’s regime and its 
colonial satellites in North and West Africa. These complex webs of connection—between 
communities of Chinese contesting colonial domination on the one hand, and between 
French Indochina’s loss of economic sovereignty and the Allied decision to act against 
Vichy in Africa on the other—point to a wider phenomenon: the globalization of imperial 
crisis under the strains of multi-continental war.
Allied victory in 1945 did nothing to reverse this globalizing dynamic. If anything, the 
emergent post-war international system made the challenge of rebuilding empire harder 
still. As Colin Gray suggests, by 1945 the most intractable problem in Europe was not 
how to make peace with Germany but, rather, how to make peace about Germany and its 
future.  So, too, the critical dilemma for those governing European colonial empires was 
to sustain control over the futures of dependent territories in international and 
transnational environments fundamentally reshaped by war. The Soviet and American 
giants were assuredly less anti-colonial in practice than their founding myths might 
suggest. The Americans recognized that European colonial spaces presented more of a 
barrier to Communist influence than any real obstacle to the advance of US free-
trade capitalism.  The Soviet regime was also too preoccupied with its own imperial 
dominance in the ‘Second World’ of Eastern Europe to invest its political energies or 
military assets in anti-colonial movements in the ‘Third World’ of Africa and Asia. This 
was a bitter disappointment to anti-colonial radicals such as the Trinidadian writer 
George Padmore, whose wartime manuscript How Russia Transformed Her Colonial 
Empire, finally published in 1946, suggested that Soviet resilience derived from its multi-
ethnic unity in service to a higher ideological cause.  But all was not lost for those hoping 
that the superpowers might yet insist that the Old World imperialists change their ways.
The US and Soviet governments were willing to intervene decisively against Western 
Europe’s ailing colonial empires when their reputations and material interests were 
affected, or when potential clients in the global South were at stake. Ironically, it was the 
United States, not the Soviet Union, that took the lead here. From Palestine to Dutch 
Indonesia, the Americans, it seemed, were strategic realists, willing to sink Europe’s 
floundering colonial ships rather than waste resource and reputation bailing them out. 
Perhaps such actions were not simply realism at work. They could be read differently as 
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the United Nations and rhetorically embedded in new instruments of international law 
that at last defined basic human rights in terms fundamentally at odds with the racial 
hierarchies of European colonialism. To sum up, however one cuts it, in this 
interpretation 1945 was a watershed for Europe and its relationship with the colonial 
world.
Let us pause a moment to consider any problems with this line of approach. For one 
thing, it is perhaps too tempting to read the history backwards. The fact that we know the 
end points of formal colonial rule may lead us to forget that, for those involved, the 
process appeared less determined and more contingent. For another thing, it is equally 
easy to trip over the supposed ‘milestone’ of the Second World War, ascribing undue 
influence to a failing capacity or will to rule among the colonial powers themselves. Such 
generalizations leave no room for agency among colonized peoples themselves and 
dismiss both rulers and ruled as essentially homogeneous, almost preprogrammed to 
behave stereotypically as reactionaries or revolutionaries.
Recognizing these interpretive problems, political analysts of European decolonization 
are now more divided over the extent to which the Second World War triggered the 
collapse of European colonial rule. Much of the evidence for a deep causal link still looks 
persuasive. Within four years of the end of the Second World War, Britain had withdrawn 
from the Indian subcontinent. The Mandate for Palestine, arguably never a workable 
proposition, had disintegrated, leaving war and refugees trailing in its wake. To the north, 
France was evicted from Syria and Lebanon, while, far to the east, Dutch recognition of 
the Indonesian Republic in December 1949 brought down the curtain on South East 
Asia’s largest European colonial project. Admittedly, UN-backed plans for trusteeships in 
former colonial territories were, in some places, abandoned or corrupted (think of British 
predominance in former Italian Libya, for instance). But, in others, they were well 
advanced.
Equally significant, the justificatory language for empire had changed profoundly, 
evidence of a widespread shift towards a technocratic, results-oriented administrative 
style that would soon become the norm in much of the global South. If basic political 
rights were still frequently denied within dependent territories, a stronger accent on 
improved living standards, sustained infrastructural investment, and proto-
industrialization gave imperial powers something with which to muffle the rising chorus 
of transnational criticism against colonial abuses. For all that, the concept of the Second 
World War as a watershed in the end of empires should not be accepted uncritically. 
Several reasons indicate why.
To make the Second World War the decisive catalyst for decolonization underestimates 
pre-war trends towards the disintegration of European colonial control. Once one adds 
these factors up, they are not so readily dismissed: early nationalist organization and 
varying forms of protest, interwar rebellions, and the economic dislocation between 
European states and dependent colonies triggered by the global depression of the early 
1930s—all were powerfully disintegrative. To take an obvious example, British rule in 
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India, while not quite rendered untenable by Mahatma Gandhi’s interwar civil resistance 
campaigns, was certainly refashioned in response to them. After the preceding years of 
protest and persecution, between 1935 and 1939 the Indian National Congress was 
induced to collaborate with imperial administration, first at provincial level, then more 
widely. Expecting India to fight a war to which its population had never assented 
undermined what Judith Brown terms this ‘collaborative nexus’, paving the way for 
wartime resumption of demonstrations, the ‘Quit India’ movement, and the jailing of 
Congress leaders.  Even so, when viewed from a more long-term perspective, the war 
years signified a reversion to earlier patterns of civil protest rather than something 
without precedent.
Primary emphasis on the years 1939–45 further implies that extraneous, war-induced 
factors precipitated empire collapse. It is hard to dispute this in relation to the fall of 
Hong Kong or Singapore or to growing US regional dominance in the Caribbean basin, 
one might say. Even so, this ‘war first’ viewpoint obscures the extent to which colonized 
individuals and groups were already taking the initiative in achieving their own 
sociopolitical advances, particularly through industrial actions, heightened—often 
transnational—political organization, and stronger claims for equality under law between 
whites and non-whites.  Equally, the ‘Second World War as catalyst’ argument minimizes 
the degree to which European colonial powers had begun adjusting forms of imperial 
control to changed economic, social, and political conditions in the colonies. To take two 
well-known examples: from the French Popular Front’s short-lived but authentic 
willingness to elaborate a colonial welfare programme to the British imperial forays into 
development epitomized by Lord Hailey’s 1938 monumental African Survey, redefining 
the scope of imperial obligation was already in the air.  In this sense, the war marked an 
interruption of planned modernization and reform, not their original cause.
Interpretational problems arise even if we do concede that the war was the principal 
agent of change. By 1945 there was an obvious geopolitical disjuncture between Asia and 
Africa that was reflected in a differential pace of decolonization. In South and 
South East Asia, European colonialism was undermined by two consecutive shock waves. 
One was the impact of Japanese regional supremacy and the occupations that came with 
it between 1942 and 1945. The other was the subsequent dominance achieved by the 
United States around the Pacific Rim. Ultimately, it was not the regulation of Japan’s 
defeat in 1945 but the development of Cold War in East Asia that dictated the terms of 
Asian decolonization, ensuring that the United States played a more dominant role in the 
colonial actions of France and the Netherlands.
So, too, in the Middle East, the war transformed regional politics and social organization, 
hastening the emergence of fully independent Arab states and intensifying the conflict 
between Arabs and Zionists in Mandate Palestine. But Africa south of the Sahara was a 
strategic backwater for most of the war, and neither colonial authorities nor most anti-
colonial nationalists envisaged national independence as an immediately achievable goal. 
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that the war made abandonment of empire inevitable. In fact, popular imperialism in 
France and Portugal especially emerged stronger after 1945 than before it.
So where does this leave us? With the Second World War reduced to the rank of merely 
one cause among many for the demise of Europe’s maritime empires? Surely that is to 
swing the pendulum too far in the opposite interpretive direction? In a field as contested 
as imperial history, it is perhaps unsurprising that forceful counter-arguments can easily 
be proposed. Let’s take some of these in turn. We know that the disappointment felt by 
colonial leaders whose demands for additional rights went unanswered after the First 
World War spurred the growth of anti-colonial protest and new forms of transnational 
anti-colonial activism. British and French imperial rule survived nonetheless.  The 
Second World War, by contrast, had made the territorial, economic, and intellectual 
certainties of European imperialism crumble away.  By early 1942 the British, Dutch, 
and French colonial federations in South East Asia were either overthrown or reduced to 
Quisling status. India was in political and communal ferment, the outlines of eventual 
partition and British withdrawal increasingly visible. Sub-Saharan African colonies, 
although rarely on the war’s strategic front lines, nonetheless experienced the global 
conflict in visceral terms because of harsher governmental demands made on recruiters, 
labourers, food producers, and families. Net purchasing power tended to decline (real-
terms price inflation was widespread). Material hardship increased. Political space 
shrank.
Admittedly, the United Nations Charter of 1946 fell short of demanding an end to colonial 
rule. Indeed, its key authors showed little enthusiasm for explicit reference to any 
presumptive right to ‘self-determination’.  The charter did, however, commit its 
signatories to develop ‘self-government’, a term for which French colonial officials quickly 
acquired an acute loathing.  And it soon became apparent, not just that colonial 
nationalist leaders expected the Allies to uphold their wartime pledges of support for 
democratic liberties, but that countless people around the world did too. Galvanized by 
transnational networks of shared interest that, for instance, linked African-Americans 
seeking an end to discrimination at home with Africans and Indians who wanted 
freedom from colonialism, the perceived right for people of shared ethnicity to govern 
themselves became more closely bound up with demands for an end to racial 
discrimination.
Having rehearsed the arguments for and against closer identification between the Second 
World War and the fate of colonial empires, the rest of this chapter tries to provide some 
answers. To do so, it explores certain themes connecting the Second World War’s impact 
and the future of European colonialism after 1945. These themes include the war’s 
effects on imperial thinking in Western Europe; connections between money and empire; 
the transition to Cold War; and, finally, a few reflections on the phenomenon of ‘politics 
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War and Imperial Thinking in Western Europe
A remarkable presumption behind the imperial policies emanating from London, Paris, 
Brussels, and The Hague in 1945 was that imperial relationships weakened by wartime 
occupations, uprisings, or deprivation could be revitalized in peace. (Portugal’s wartime 
neutrality, although tenuously observed, spared it the worst of the conflict. If this set the 
Salazarist regime apart, the Lusophone imperial core of Angola and Mozambique was 
strongly affected by developments in neighbouring Belgian Congo and the settler-
dominated regimes of British Southern Africa.) Portugal aside, the human and material 
costs of maintaining empire fell on four European countries devastated by war. Among 
them, only Britain escaped the divisive legacies of wartime collaboration at home and 
imperially.  For all that, Britain—like France, the Netherlands, and Belgium—was 
financially prostrate. Their governments looked to Washington for short-term financial 
relief, aware that tasks of domestic reconstruction were their first priority. 
Redistributionist fiscal policies, welfare reforms, and ambitious public spending were 
pursued through continuing peacetime austerity. And this determination to lay more 
equitable foundations for future domestic prosperity informed the two strands of political 
belief newly dominant in post-war north-western Europe: left-tinged social democracy 
and Catholic Christian democracy. Each emerged within a post-war cultural environment 
presciently described by scholars as one of ‘life after death’ in which relief at surviving 
the war was matched by reification of the family as the bedrock of society.
The inward focus within the societies of Western Europe’s imperial states does not, 
though, imply any governmental or popular turn away from empire. To the contrary: the 
urgency of post-war domestic reform was matched by imperial administrative changes 
that seemed almost hyperactive after the lassitude imposed by economic depression and 
war. Between 1945 and 1947 sweeping constitutional rewrites, mulled over in wartime, 
were rolled out—piecemeal in the British case, throughout its empire in the French case. 
Development, once conceived primarily in terms of grand but remote 
infrastructural projects, was reinvented as something meaningfully local. Additional 
schools, piped water, housing schemes: all were potentially socially transformative 
because they were closer to the people.  This accent on bottom-up improvement in living 
standards was matched by new thinking about imperial citizenship, local governance, 
even democratic inclusion. French and British post-war imperial vocabulary replaced 
‘colonies’ with ‘territories’, ‘Commonwealth partnerships’, and ‘unions’. The same might 
have held true in Dutch as well had not Indonesian independence been declared in 
August 1945 in open defiance of the anticipated return of imperial administration.
Would there be a repeat of 1919, when peacemaking fostered new ways of thinking about 
imperial relationships and ethnic rights that were quickly snuffed out as colonial rulers 
retreated into old habits? The rapidity with which violence and rebellion engulfed colonial 
South East Asia might suggest so. To the west, the calamitous aftermath of Indian 
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more chaotic future, one in which the end of empire unleashed communalist impulses 
that left millions of refugees dispossessed or stateless.  In colonial Africa and the 
Caribbean, though, the results were mixed. Problems abounded north of the Saharan 
belt. A bitter May 1945 uprising amidst near-famine conditions in eastern Algeria and 
sustained political and industrial militancy in neighbouring Morocco and Tunisia exposed 
levels of nationalist opposition that ultimately rendered French North Africa 
ungovernable. In Egypt dispute over the scope and strategic implications of Britain’s 
treaty rights intensified years before the Free Officers’ Movement seized power in July 
1952. Ironically, former Italian Libya, epicentre of the Second World War in Africa and 
scene of vicious reprisal killings during the changes of regime that accompanied that 
campaign’s back-and-forth progress, perhaps occasioned the greatest optimism. Its 
trusteeship status, stalled at the UN, remained in dispute throughout the late 1940s. Even 
so, the end of Fascist colonialism and post-war international oversight registered 
improvements of a sort.  In sharp contrast, at Africa’s southern tip, the victory of Dr D. F. 
Malan’s National Party in June 1948 heralded the programmatic introduction of 
apartheid, an institutionalization of total racial discrimination long in gestation.  Albeit 
an extreme manifestation, South Africa’s race politics foretold a deeper imperial truth. In 
Portuguese and French territories as well as in British, the status of Africa’s white 
settlers would precipitate the longest and bitterest struggles of European empire’s end.
Evidence of disorder, violence, and discrimination in the global colonial landscape after 
1945 is easy to find, but in some places the possibility of dialogue and enhanced imperial 
relationships persisted. Without simply moving from one colonial region to the next, the 
case of francophone Africa suffices to prove the point. French black Africa in the post-war 
decade witnessed the two extremes of repression resumed and reformist horizons 
widening. Madagascar exemplified the former: a 1947 revolt brutally suppressed at a cost 
of perhaps 100,000 lives. But, in much of French black Africa, what historian Frederick 
Cooper describes as a ‘claims-making culture’ took root. Colonial voices in politics, the 
workplace, student residencies, and civil society tuned into the inclusive 
language of France’s Fourth Republic; indeed, more than that: they shaped it.  The long-
held French republican design of empire integration, fashioned through the 
dissemination of French language and culture and idealized in terms of colour-blind 
citizenship and rights equivalence, was far from realization. But the talk of wider 
citizenship, enhanced worker entitlements, strategic investment, and greater 
intercultural respect was more than empty rhetoric that could be wished away once its 
metropolitan opponents regained office. Along with the language, the terms of imperial 
politics had changed. The principal consequence was that people of influence throughout 
French West Africa discerned unprecedented possibilities for social improvement, 
democratization, and federal partnership within the framework of empire. Much as this 
points to a post-Second World War imperial ‘moment’ of more lasting duration than that 
of the Paris peace settlements, so, too, does the generational shift among the political 
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For many in Clement Attlee’s Labour administration, wartime experience in government 
confirmed their belief in state intervention as the locomotive of societal change.  The 
Fabian reformism of some Labour colonial specialists melded remarkably well with 
Colonial Office gradualism. Each was informed by positivist notions that benevolent 
administration validated British imperial authority. Meanwhile, in France, where the 
Socialist and Communist Left shared power with Christian Democrats and other centrist 
groups, wartime resistance—and, by extension, collaboration—had refashioned politics. A 
resistance past became a badge of republican legitimacy, which, somewhat paradoxically, 
French Communists and right-wing supporters of Charles de Gaulle mobilized for 
opposing political purposes. And the arc traced by resistance supporters from outlaws to 
national leaders resonated among anti-colonial groups from Algeria to Vietnam. All 
followed the same cue, couching their demands in terms of the right to resist unjust 
foreign rule. Little wonder that, all too briefly, France’s new leadership felt bound to 
negotiate with Ho Chi Minh’s Hanoi regime before resolving to crush it in late 1946.
Shaped by markedly different wartime political cultures, those governing the post-war 
empires of Britain and France thus shared a willingness to tackle the imperial fissures 
opened by the war, recognizing that colonial practices could not simply continue as 
before. But these commendable impulses were soon dampened by their shrinking room to 
manoeuvre economically and strategically. Huge wartime debts and hardening East–West 
enmity transformed the political context in which imperial rebuilding was supposed to 
occur. More than excuses, the twin pressures of austerity and Cold War quickly 
circumscribed the thinking about self-determination, capacious imperial citizenship, even 
negotiated withdrawal that pervaded colonial ministries immediately after the war 
ended.  Attlee’s government, for instance, expected colonial economic assets to assist 
the recovery of sterling. And, although the prime minister famously ventured the 
suggestion of a Middle East pull-out in 1947, by the time Labour left office in 1951 the 
idea seemed outlandish.
Money, Empire, and Cold War
The preceding observations bring us to the identification between global status, monetary 
resources, and empire. A long-established phenomenon, it emerged stronger than ever 
after 1945. The British case was especially instructive. Sterling’s uncertain future as both 
a reserve and a transactions currency in a global trading system dominated by US dollars 
redefined official thinking about the value of imperial connections. Britain’s war spending 
was funded, in part, by borrowing from empire treasuries, meaning that the country 
entered peacetime with a large imperial war debt. India was Britain’s largest colonial 
creditor, its 1.3 billion of sterling assets (at 1946 values) critical to British liquidity. Other 
imperial territories accounted for an additional billion plus, Egypt and Sudan alone 
holding 400 million. Only after tough talking with the major empire creditors, notably 
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avert a crisis over these sterling balances.  Self-interest trumped fellow feeling here. It 
made no sense for Commonwealth governments or soon-to-be-independent India to 
undermine sterling’s value in international markets.  Nor were Britain and, by extension, 
France, financially toothless. Each could still use strategic investment, customs tariffs, 
and tax breaks to foster a climate favourable to home industries and, by extension, less 
favourable to other outsiders. Amidst the emergent Bretton Woods system of dollar-
dominated global free trade, there remained substantial pockets of protected European 
imperial economic influence that would endure into the 1950s and beyond.
This, though, was far from the whole story of war, money, and empire economics. Of much 
greater significance to many occupied and dependent populations was the war’s impact 
on price stability. From Greece to Vietnam a toxic combination of state requisitioning and 
rampant inflation rendered essential foodstuffs either unavailable, unaffordable, or both. 
The result was famine. Japanese extraction of the bulk of Vietnamese rice during lean 
harvest years in 1943 and, more especially, 1944 created a starvation belt that stretched 
along Tonkin’s Red River Delta. Conservative estimates suggest a death toll among the 
north Vietnamese of half a million. Probably higher, this dreadful human cost of new-style 
colonial occupation was integral to the Vietnamese revolution over the summer of 1945. 
The Communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam established in Hanoi during August–
September made peasant land reform a central plank in its programme for a post-colonial 
state.
At much the same time, famine also engulfed north-eastern India. Slow to respond, 
British authorities in Bengal ultimately failed to alleviate chronic food shortages 
precipitated by requisitioning, rising costs, and a breakdown in Bengal’s agricultural 
market system.  By the end of 1944 some 3 million Bengalis had died. A searing 
indictment of colonial inability to guarantee human life through the economic stresses of 
world war, Bengal’s famine utterly discredited British rule. Meanwhile, the disintegration 
of social solidarity among Bengal’s starving population heightened Gandhi and other 
Congress leaders’ determination to foster stronger national cohesion among 
India’s poor.  Whether for colonial powers or their opponents, wartime famine thus 
registered stronger social and political impact than any promises of impending peace and 
a return to the certainties of European imperial rule.
With India and Palestine the most striking examples, the European colonial withdrawals 
of the late 1940s also triggered huge population movements and altered long-established 
economic and cultural relationships within and between countries and communities.
The post-war surge in empire disorder changed the points of contact between First World 
and Third. So, too, in the ‘Second World’—the Eastern European and other territories 
living under Soviet dominion—interest in decolonization mounted. For some Eastern 
Europeans, anti-colonial activism was perceived as evidence of authentic socialist 
revolution (as in Vietnam or, rather later, in Cuba). For others, colonial insurgencies were 
read as proof that seemingly immovable foreign occupations could be successfully 
challenged.  Some imperial powers also reinvigorated empire connections at the same 
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the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s white Europeans still departed in their 
thousands—in the British and Portuguese cases, in their hundreds of thousands—for 
countries that retained imperial connections to the homeland.  Simultaneously, migrant 
traffic flowing in the opposite direction, from dependencies past or present to Europe, 
also reshaped European societies demographically, culturally, and politically.
As for the Cold War, it was the imperial powers’ misfortune to set about post-war imperial 
reconstruction along the conflict’s fault lines in South East Asia, the Middle East, and 
Africa.  Crisis after crisis tumbled into one another within the Dutch, British, and French 
empires over the next quarter-century. As in 1919, so after 1945, the United States was 
critical. It weakened the grip of colonial powers: the Dutch in Indonesia; the British in 
Palestine; initially at least, the French in Indochina. At the same time Washington 
disappointed those colonial subjects who anticipated a brave new world of democratic 
freedom.  Just as 1919 witnessed a fleeting Wilsonian moment, so the years 1944 to 
1947 might be identified as a second ‘moment’ in which America might have played its 
diplomatic and strategic cards in the anti-colonialists’ favour.
Events turned out otherwise. Post-war US administrations did more to conserve colonial 
systems than to destroy them.  Once overwhelmingly explained in terms of Cold War 
zero-sum thinking—the imperatives of Western strategic interest trumping the empty 
rhetoric of US anti-colonialism—historians have, more recently, been drawn to other 
explanations for this shift in American approach. The most subtle posit that the United 
States worked with its British and French partners to ease their withdrawal from empire, 
clearing a path for US dominance while, for the most part, avoiding open confrontation.
President Truman’s ‘layered conception of sovereignty’ cast self-determination not as a 
basic right, but as an ideal condition contingent on the abilities and willingness of the 
people involved to adhere to Western standards and political loyalties.  Back in 1945 it 
was in the Far East that the European imperialists were feeblest and American military 
might most decisive.
The restoration of British imperial authority in post-war Malaya was assigned to 
a military administration poorly equipped to handle the deepening social crisis it 
confronted. Its most visible indicators were epidemics and malnutrition. Alongside 
malaria, the perennial killer of rural populations in weakened physical condition, 
localized outbreaks of smallpox, cholera, and typhoid added to an escalating mortality 
rate. Municipal authorities in Singapore and other coastal cities were overwhelmed by an 
influx of refugees and the wartime displaced. Increasing numbers of industrial workers 
were drawn to the radicalism of Malaya’s Communist Party, the one political organization 
that could boast a solid war record of resistance to the Japanese. These disturbed 
conditions, strikes and health scares, rising criminality, workplace disorders, and the 
radicalization of Malaya’s trade unions formed the backdrop to the restoration of civil 
administration in 1945–6.  By the time colonial governance was restored over the winter 
of 1945–6, Malaya’s population was in no mood to respond to the reforms pain-stakingly 
devised by British officials in anticipation of their post-war return to South East Asia. The 
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government to more equitable citizenship rights for Malaya’s three principal ethnic 
groups—Malays, overseas Chinese, and south Indians. Well intentioned but arrogantly 
imposed, the Malayan Union triggered fierce opposition from Malay community leaders 
fearful of a loss of privilege within a society in which Malaya’s two major immigrant 
groups would at last acquire basic civil rights. British colonial authority was soon 
outflanked, on the one hand by Malay conservatives anxious to preserve Malaya’s long-
standing communal hierarchy, on the other by Communists determined to exploit the 
war’s social dislocations. British schemes for new citizenship arrangements, more 
inclusive governance, and ultimate self-government would all have to be rethought as 
Malaya descended into political violence over the summer of 1948.
Malaya’s post-war crisis, unique in its communal dynamics, was also part of a wider post-
war regional trend. As we know, in Vietnam, too, Japanese occupation, Communist 
revolution, and the northern famine that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives made the 
restoration of French authority, let alone French imperial legitimacy, an impossible task. 
French policy after 1948 therefore hinged on building up an alternative, conservative 
locus of Vietnamese nationalism. French officials vested their hopes in the former 
emperor of Annam, Bảo Đại, as a non-Communist Vietnamese national figurehead. And 
the French military increasingly sought to ‘Vietnamize’ its war against the Communist-led 
regime in the north by developing a Vietnamese national army to take more of the strain.
Decolonization from the Dutch East Indies meanwhile unfolded during four years of 
violent struggle that followed Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta’s announcement of the 
unilateral independence of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. In Indochina, French forces 
fought an eight-year war against Ho Chi Minh’s Communist-led Vietminh coalition that 
ended in crushing defeat and final French withdrawal after the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 
May 1954. In both cases, the Dutch and French colonial authorities had to fight their way 
back into power, meeting determined nationalist resistance after the phased withdrawal 
of British occupation forces in late 1945–6. But in neither Indonesia nor 
Indochina were the Dutch and French imperial authorities simply fighting to restore 
colonial power. The Netherlands colonial authorities sought to build up a federation of 
pro-Dutch Indonesian states that would counterbalance the power of Sukarno’s 
republican regime in Java. The strength of ethnic, religious, and regional differences 
among the populations of the Indonesian archipelago, and the residual power of pro-
Dutch elites in the outer provinces, including Indonesia’s second most populous island, 
Sumatra, seemed to favour Dutch efforts to cement a network of autonomous island 
governments, the so-called Malino states, that would acquiesce in an Indonesian 
federation under Dutch supervision.
It was against this backcloth that the two Dutch ‘police actions’ in Indonesia, the first in 
July 1947, the second in December 1948, unfolded. Blighted by flagrant military abuses 
against Indonesian civilians, each was intended to strengthen the Dutch hand in 
independence talks with Sukarno’s government in the Javanese capital Djokjakarta. In the 
first police action of July 1947 Dutch colonial forces mounted a limited offensive in Java. 
This proved sufficient to wrest further concessions from the republican government in the 
43
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January 1948 Renville Agreement over the precise timing and preconditions for any 
transfer of power. But the second police action was politically disastrous. In flagrant 
violation of the Renville stipulations, on 19 December 1948 Dutch paratroopers took 
control of Djokjakarta, only to pull back twenty-four hours later under a barrage of 
international criticism. Whereas France and Britain, both Security Council members, 
were well placed to block General Assembly consideration of their colonial improprieties, 
the Netherlands government was not. Far from strengthening their bargaining position, 
Dutch colonial officials ensured that the transfer of power in Indonesia would take place 
on American, not Dutch, terms.
Cold War and Empire Politics through Violence
The examples of worsening violence in late colonial Malaya, Vietnam, and Indonesia 
illustrate a wider post-war phenomenon of the global South. Certain elements of the 
European imperial breakdowns in Africa and Asia after 1945 proved to be less nationally 
specific than colonially generic. Federations attempted, then abandoned; improvised, 
often chaotic, partitions; hardening settler opposition to black majority rule; and 
insurgencies that proved difficult to contain: these were phenomena of European 
decolonization whose consequences tended to spread beyond their original locale. 
Cumulatively, this disintegration of European–colonial connections was globalizing in its 
effects. Indeed, decolonization is perhaps better understood as a global process rather 
than within an analytical framework confined to a particular empire. Europe–colonial 
world conflicts were typically ‘bottom up’ in nature, characterized by substantial 
mobilization of the colonized and comparatively less commitment by the imperial power.
Usually at a technological disadvantage, colonial insurgents turned instead to 
propaganda and the printed word, consolidating regional networks of support among 
sympathetic neighbours and publicizing their cause at the UN, in foreign press outlets, 
and in televisual media. As Chris Goscha has indicated for French Vietnam and Matthew 
Connelly for French Algeria, only rarely did the ‘weak’ achieve victory through 
decolonization by military means. More often, they won the moral argument, leaving 
Western Europe’s imperial nations struggling to make their more progressive arguments 
for empire seem anything other than self-serving.
Those interested in deeper, impersonal forces might be frustrated at how rarely 
decolonization is examined as a global phenomenon, one in which Europe’s Second World 
War experiences transformed its relations with the colonial world. To be sure, histories 
frequently ‘join the dots’, suggesting that colonial collapses unfolded inexorably, even 
predictably, one after another. And the Second World War is often identified at the trigger. 
The point is that these presumptive links and individual empire approaches may conceal 
as much as they reveal. Linking colonial withdrawals in a domino theory-type sequence 
does not tell us very much, not least because some pull-outs were violent and total while 
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recognize that these post-war shifts were inherently transnational, the changes in 
sovereignty involved sometimes of less imminent consequence than the movement of 
people, ideas, and political actions across colonial—and empire—boundaries that 
resulted. To be sure, decolonization, by its nature, lent itself to emulation. Its catalysts, 
transnational or otherwise, and the shared dilemmas of imperial powers were not 
somehow illegible to those caught up in the process. Far from it: after 1945 opposition to 
imperial rule transformed a geopolitical system otherwise placed in stasis by Cold War. 
Necessarily global, the interaction between war, Europe, and the wider world, oft-times 
described by the shorthand term ‘decolonization’, would alter the terms on which 
international politics were conducted, on which capital and trade flows proceeded, and on 
which cultural and political attachments were understood.
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